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Abstract 
Many companies place advertisements on search engine result pages, a practice 
referred to as search engine advertising (SEA). If their website also appears among the 
organic results, it is questionable whether SEA makes sense: Free clicks may be 
substituted by costly clicks on the advertisement (paid result). We propose a model that 
determines when paid results complement organic results and when they cannibalize 
them. The model explains both interaction effects by the characteristics of the triggering 
keyword and the specificity of the advertisement. We evaluate the model in a field 
experiment in the context of a quasi-monopolistic company and approx. nine million 
search queries that contain its brand names (brand bidding). This helps to reduce 
possible biases from competition and user heterogeneity. Preliminary results suggest 
that superior net effects can be achieved by placing ads for search queries that indicate 
a navigational or transactional search intention compared to informational searches. 
Keywords:  Search Engine Advertising, Brand Bidding, Cannibalization 
Introduction 
Search engine advertising (SEA), the practice of placing advertisements on search engine result pages 
(SERPs), has become the primary form of online marketing in the last years. In 2013, US advertisers spent 
almost half (43%) of their total online advertising budget of $42.78 billion on SEA and other search-
engine related marketing forms (IAB 2014). 
Basically, SEA works as follows: First, advertisers create an ad at the SEA platform of a search engine. The 
ad consists of a title, an ad text, and a link to the target website. Then, they specify which search queries 
should trigger this ad by assigning it keywords (e.g., “jogging shoes”). Each keyword may contain several 
words as in the example. Each time a user enters a search query (e.g., “red jogging shoes”) into the search 
engine, all ads with keywords matching this search query (to some degree) are candidates for display. The 
presence of an ad consequently depends on the user’s search query and is called a paid result, in contrast 
to the so-called organic results created on the basis of website content and other criteria. To determine if 
and in which position on the SERP to display the ad, a ranking mechanism is defined. For this purpose, 
most search engines employ a real-time auction, i.e., they rank the ads based on monetary bids placed by 
advertisers for the triggering keyword. Since it is one of the main goals of search engines to present 
relevant results, they often adjust the advertisers’ bids by an estimate of the target website’s relevance to 
the user, the quality score, and some other criteria before ordering the ads. Some candidate ads may not 
be displayed at all if their adjusted bid is too low (from the search engine’s point of view). If more ads 
should be displayed than fit on one SERP, they are placed on the next page.  Usually, advertisers do not 
have to pay the search engine for mere impressions of their ad but rather for each click of a user (pay per 
click, PPC). The actual cost per click (CPC) depends on the ad position assigned by the search engine and 
the cost for the next lower ad position. It is usually lower than the maximum bid placed by the advertiser. 
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Brand bidding refers to bidding on keywords that contain a brand name, therefore called branded 
keywords (e.g., “nike jogging shoes”). Note that we focus in this paper on advertisers bidding only on 
brand names that they own but it is also possible and legal in many countries to bid on brand names of 
competitors. On one hand, only a few advertisers engage in this strategy referred to as “piggybacking” 
(Rosso and Jansen 2010), so that the competition for branded keywords is usually lower than for non-
branded or generic keywords. Furthermore, search engines consider advertisers’ target websites as more 
relevant if the user’s search query contains their brand name, leading to higher quality scores (Abou 
Nabout and Skiera 2012a). Low competition and high quality scores afford a low CPC. On the other hand, 
branded keywords typically generate more clicks, more conversions and higher revenues (Abou Nabout 
and Skiera 2012b). This might be due to a spill-over effect (Rutz and Bucklin 2011): Users searching for 
branded keywords are usually in a later state of their conversion process, having searched for generic 
keywords in an earlier step. 
With branded keywords leading to higher revenues and a lower CPC, it may be surprising why not all 
advertisers who engage in SEA also engage in brand bidding. One possible explanation is that search 
engines usually rank the organic results according to their estimated relevance to the user (e.g., Vaughan 
2004). Since, as mentioned earlier, advertisers’ target websites are considered as more relevant if the 
user’s search query contains their brand name, they typically will rank high among the organic results. If 
advertisers still engage in brand bidding, the user is confronted with two prominently posed results 
(organic and paid) linking to the same website (although possibly to a different landing page within this 
website). In this situation, both results may interact in the following way (see also Abou Nabout and 
Skiera 2012b): On one hand, the paid result may attract users who in its absence would not click on the 
organic result. This is called the addition effect and can lead to an increase in the overall clicking 
probability and thus, ceteris paribus, also to an increase in advertisers’ expected revenues. On the other 
hand, the paid result may lure some users who would otherwise click on the organic result. This so-called 
cannibalization effect may increase advertisers’ costs, assuming a PPC compensation scheme, because 
they have to pay for clicks that they could have had for free.  
It is not obvious whether the increase in revenues due to the addition effect or the increase in costs due to 
the cannibalization effect will overweigh and, therefore, whether engaging in brand bidding is a profitable 
strategy for advertisers. First empirical findings (Abou Nabout and Skiera 2012b) suggest that this is the 
case despite the existence of considerable cannibalization of both, clicks and conversions. These results 
are just averages over a few different keywords and a single ad text. Thus, it remains unclear how different 
keyword characteristics and the ad text influence the interaction effects. This knowledge would be of great 
use for advertisers because it would first enable them to select the keywords for which brand bidding pays 
off most and second support their decision on the ad text and their bid for given keywords. This is the 
research gap we aim to address with this work. For this purpose, we develop and test a model of users’ 
behavior that allows a direct explanation of both interaction effects on three levels: clicks, conversions, 
and profit. So far, however, we only have addressed the click level. 
We decided to conduct a field experiment in the real environment of a popular search engine (Google) and 
a well-known advertiser. We chose an advertiser who is a monopolist in the sense that his products cannot 
be bought on any other website. Competitive products exist but our partner is the market leader. The 
reason for our choice is the following: Users searching with branded keywords are usually in a late state of 
their conversion process, as mentioned above; hence, they can be assumed to have a clear desire (e.g., to 
buy jogging shoes). This desire can, furthermore, be assumed to be related to the advertiser’s brand at this 
stage so that there is little substitutability in the user’s mind (e.g., Nike jogging shoes will not be 
substituted by Adidas jogging shoes or vice versa). However, because we consider a monopolistic 
advertiser whose target website is the only website where they can fulfil this desire (unlike Nike shoes, 
which can be bought from many retailers), they finally must visit this website. The only remaining 
variable is whether they do this by clicking on the organic result or by clicking on the paid result. In this 
sense, we can attempt for the first time a “pure” evaluation of both interaction effects that is neither 
affected by user heterogeneity in form of a user’s long-term preferences (e.g., store preference) nor by 
short-term competition among retailers (e.g., sale actions). These factors have been shown to influence 
the performance of a SEA campaign (e.g., Gauzente 2009; Gauzente 2010; Animesh et al. 2011) but 
usually cannot be directly observed (Yang and Ghose 2010). Hence, it is helpful to exclude their variances 
from econometric estimations. 
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To summarize, we extend previous research first by investigating how keyword characteristics and the ad 
text drive the interaction effects. Second, our experiment permits for the first time a pure evaluation of 
these interaction effects. Further, our dataset enables us to undertake a third extension of prior research 
because the conversion-related data can be broken down by product and specific consumer behavior as 
follows: With respect to products, we are able to test whether an ad promoting a specific product increases 
the number of orders of this product (compared to a general ad text) and how this relates to the number of 
orders of other products. As far as consumers are concerned, we can test the effects of brand bidding on 
their site registration behavior. Further analyses of consumer characteristics in this context were not 
possible due to strong data privacy rules kept by the company. 
Our results are relevant for all advertisers who consider engaging in brand bidding.  
Previous Work 
In a broad context, this paper relates to all studies investigating the interaction between SEA and other 
instruments from online marketing (Gopal et al. 2011; Kireyev et al. 2013) or offline marketing (Goldfarb 
and Tucker 2011). More specifically, we focus on the interplay between SEA and organic search engine 
results. This relates to several papers that investigate how user behavior is affected by the simultaneous 
presence of organic and paid results. It has been found that users in this situation strongly prefer the 
organic results (Jerath et al. 2013), although the paid results had practically the same relevance (Jansen et 
al. 2007). This may be because some users are negatively biased against paid results (Jansen 2007), which 
has a significant impact on their clicking intention and behavior (Gauzente 2009). 
Against this background, some studies have analyzed the interaction between an organic and a paid result 
from the same advertiser (as it is the case for brand bidding). Yang and Ghose (2010) find a 
complementary relationship between both results, i.e., a positive correlation between the corresponding 
clicking probabilities. Furthermore, they find in a field experiment that the total number of clicks per 
impression, the total number of conversions per click, and the total revenue are higher if a paid result is 
present. Agarwal et al. (2011) confirm that the presence of an organic result increases the total probability 
of a click but report a decrease in the probability of a conversion. However, as we argue in the section on 
assumptions, these results do not necessarily apply to the situation of brand bidding (by a well-known 
advertiser). Furthermore, they only relate to the addition effect (although the effect is not specified in the 
same way). Even if clicks, conversions, or revenues rise, the effect of SEA cannot be precisely controlled 
without consideration of cannibalization effects as we do below. Addressing this issue, Abou Nabout and 
Skiera (2012b) conduct a field experiment in a brand bidding context. They pause the paid result for some 
weeks and measure both interaction effects by simple performance comparisons between the periods with 
and without the paid result being present. With their approach, they are able to judge the overall 
interaction effects, but they do not attempt to identify the drivers behind them. In this work, keyword 
characteristics are considered as one driver of interaction effects. Thereby, it also adds up to a stream of 
research investigating which keyword characteristics explain users’ click and purchase behavior (e.g., 
Ghose and Yang 2009). 
Some other studies, mostly using game theory, have dealt with the effects of the presence of organic 
results on the optimal bid for advertisers (e.g., Katona and Sarvary 2010; Xu et al. 2012).  This is not the 
only decision an advertiser has to make, however: First, he has to decide for which keywords he should 
bid at all. Our work contributes to the literature on this task (e.g., Rutz and Bucklin 2007; Thomaidou and 
Vazirgiannis 2011) by enabling advertisers to select keywords that improve the increment of their profit by 
engaging in SEA. This increment can be calculated by the interaction effects. Our work additionally 
provides alternative keyword performance measures as mentioned in the introduction. Second, 
advertisers have to decide about which ad text to choose (e.g., Animesh et al. 2011). Regarding this task, 
Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. (2010) have investigated how the similarity of an ad to the organic result 
influences the clicking probabilities. Besides, Jansen et al. (2011) have found that the combination of 
branded keywords with ad texts containing brand information leads to 15 times more revenue than any 
other combination. We extend these results by analyzing the influence of similarity between an ad and the 
corresponding organic result as another driver of interaction effects in the context of brand bidding. 
The influence of brand bidding on specific products and the interaction of user registration behavior and 
brand bidding have not been studied yet, to the best of our knowledge. 
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Model 
Interaction Effects 
To quantify the addition and the cannibalization effect, we first have to define how these effects can be 
modeled and operationalized. We begin by considering both interaction effects with respect to clicks. At 
this level, we measure the addition effect by the conditional probability    
    that a user searching with  
keyword   on day   will click (on any result) when the ad is shown, given that he would not have clicked 
on the organic result if the ad were not shown. Similarly, we measure the cannibalization effect by the 
conditional probability    
     that a user who would have clicked on the organic result in the absence of 
the paid result will switch to clicking on the paid result in its presence. 
Previous research (e.g., Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. 2010; Yang and Ghose 2010) has found the search 
intention of users as assumed on the basis of the triggering keyword    to be an important determinant of 
the probability of a click. Hence, we allow both interaction effects to depend on the user’s search intention 
by employing a taxonomy that classifies search queries into three categories: informational, navigational, 
and transactional (Broder 2002). These categories are associated with the intention to gain a certain 
piece of information, to reach a certain website, or to perform a certain action (resp.). We define three 
corresponding dummy variables               ,              , and                that take the value 1 if 
and only if    belongs to the respective category. Since the classification of    cannot always be determined 
objectively, we apply the following classification rules: If    contains parts of the URL of the target website 
or similar terms (e.g., misspellings), it is assumed to be navigational (82 keywords in our experiment). If 
it is related to a product, it is assumed to be transactional (42 keywords). Else, it is considered 
informational (94 keywords). In the following, informational keywords act as reference category. 
In order to investigate the influence of the specificity of an ad on the interaction effects, we also include a 
dummy variable               in our model that takes the value 1 if  the ad shown on day   for keyword   
advertises a specific product and the value 0 otherwise. Correspondingly, we define another dummy 
variable                  taking the value 1 if the keyword    contains the name of the product advertised 
and the value 0 otherwise. Note that                    implies                 . In our dataset, it 
also implies                 due to a requirement described later; thus, we cannot include an interaction 
term between these two variables. 
To account for the advertiser’s choice of words in the ad text and the decision on his bid for a keyword, we 
add two variables that relate to these decisions to our model: the relevance of the ad to the user 
(                ) and the (daily average of the) position of the ad (               ). We operationalize 
                 by the percentage of words in the keyword    that the ad shown on day    for    contains. 
For the explanation of the cannibalization effect, we also include two analogous variables,               
and               . These variables account for the relative importance of the organic result compared to 
the paid result that users evaluate when deciding on which result to click. Remember that for 
                and               , lower values correspond to a higher position on the SERP with 1 being 
the best value. Note that these variables are endogenous since they result from the calculation of the 
search engine (e.g., Agarwal et al. 2011). So far, we do not account for this endogeneity, however, since 
this would greatly complicate the estimation of our model without being expected to change the results 
significantly (as the variation of both variables can be assumed to be relatively low in our context).  
Finally, we control for possible industrial dynamics by adding a linear time trend        (Yang and 
Ghose 2010) and for possible weekend effects (Hemant and Ramachandran 2011) by a dummy variable 
         that takes the value 1 on weekends and the value 0 otherwise. Assuming a logistic regression 
model, these rationales lead to the following equations: 
   (
    
   
      
   
)                                                                               
                                                         
(1) 
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(2) 
Assumptions and Estimation 
To simplify estimation, we make three assumptions about user behavior: 
1) We assume that each user clicks at most once per impression; i.e., repeated clicks (on the same result) 
and dual clicks (clicks on both results) do not occur. This is reasonable because the user has no incentive 
to click multiple times, given that both results usually link to the same website. Alternative assumptions, 
such as the independence of clicks on both results as posited by Yang and Ghose (2010), could be made 
easily without an essential change of the model. However, due to the lack of user-level data, none of these 
assumptions can be tested; hence, the best one can do is to assume a plausible user behavior. 
2) We assume that the sheer presence of an ad does not discourage users from clicking (on any result). 
This is consistent with the observation that users consider paid results less intrusive than other internet 
advertising forms (e.g., banner) because they are related to their search queries (e.g., Gauzente 2009; 
Ghose and Yang 2009). Therefore, there seems to be no reason why a user willing to click in the absence 
of an ad should change his mind and not click at all just because an ad is displayed. Furthermore, as 
reasoned earlier, users in a quasi-monopolistic context finally need to visit the advertiser’s target website 
in order to fulfill their desire (as implied by their use of branded keywords).  
3) We assume that users who are newly attracted by a paid result reach the target website by actually 
clicking on the paid result. To justify this, it can be argued that if a user prefers to click on the organic 
result instead, it is unlikely that he would not have done so if no ad were present. While in prior research 
(Yang and Ghose 2010), engaging in SEA has also increased the number of clicks on the organic result, we 
expect this to happen only very rarely (if at all) in the context we investigate because of the following 
rationale: Highly positioned organic results increase brand awareness, especially for less known goods or 
services (Dou et al. 2010). This can also be expected for paid results that appear on top of a SERP. Thus, 
in case of less known websites that achieve lower organic ranks, a paid result may support the organic 
result so that users better recall the product/company when they encounter it in a lower position. This 
increases the likelihood that they click on this less known link. In case of strong brands, however, this 
effect is negligent for two reasons: First, the corresponding website is almost always visible, usually taking 
one of the top spots on the SERP. Second, a paid result seldom changes the awareness of a brand that 
almost “everybody” knows. A spillover to the organic result is almost nonexistent in this case.  
Assumptions 2) and 3) have implicitly also been made by previous research (e.g., Abou Nabout and Skiera 
2012b). In any case, these working assumptions can be relaxed in the future by using a more complex 
econometrical model. Note, however, that they are also not critical for our current model; their violation 
may only introduce a small bias in the results as our analyses have shown. 
Under assumption 1), users who are presented a SERP with an organic result and a paid result from the 
same advertiser have three possibilities: To click on the organic result, to click on the paid result, or not to 
click at all. Correspondingly, their behavior can be described by a random variable that follows a 
multinomial distribution with the number of impressions (of both results),              , as the number 
of trials and        
   
,        
    
, and          
      with        
             
           
    
 as the probabilities of 
the respective click events. Since the absolute numbers of clicks on each result are observed, these 
probabilities can be calculated easily via Maximum Likelihood. 
Our approach for identifying    
    and    
     is to relate them to        
      and        
   
. For this purpose, 
we first consider the users who click on any result in the presence of the paid result. Under assumption 2), 
they recruit themselves on the one hand from all users who would also have clicked if only the organic 
result had been present. Let us denote the corresponding probability as        
     . On the other hand, the 
users newly attracted by the ad due to the addition effect add up to        
     , which, therefore, is given by 
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      (         
     )     
     (3) 
Note that the identification of the addition effect does not require assumption 3) because to calculate (3), 
only the total probabilities of a click are necessary. Additionally assuming 3), we can express        
   
 as 
       
           
      (     
    ). (4) 
(4) states that the users clicking on the organic result in the presence of the paid result are the users who 
in its absence would also have clicked on the organic result and whose clicks are not cannibalized. 
By (3) and (4),    
    and    
     could be identified if        
      were observable when an ad is displayed. 
Since this is not possible, however, we calculate it by the logistic model 
   (
         
     
           
     
)                                                                           
                                                       
(5) 
and estimate the corresponding parameter vector   by observations made when only the organic result is 
displayed. In this situation,        
      is identified by               and the absolute number of clicks on 
the organic result similarly to         
   
 when an ad is displayed. Based on the resulting estimate  ̂ of  , we 
impute        
      for each observation in the presence of an ad so that it is known in (3) and (4). 
In addition to all variables from (1) and (2) that are not specific to the paid result, we included 
             in (5), a value that is correlated with the number of advertisers who bid for the keyword    
and, hence, a proxy for the number of (paid) results that could distract the user from clicking on the 
organic result of the advertiser under consideration.            
 
 is reported by Google as a moving 
average with a seemingly long period so that we found very little daily variation in this value during our 
experiment for the great majority of keywords. Therefore, it is sufficient to observe              as an 
average value over the whole experiment period in this case. 
Field Experiment and Dataset 
As described in the introduction, our dataset stems from a field experiment conducted in cooperation with 
a big, quasi-monopolistic company as advertiser. Due to the confidentiality of the data, we cannot reveal 
the company’s name, industry branch, or products. We can only reveal that the products are a commodity, 
not very expensive, and therefore very well suited for online sales (Keisidou et al. 2011). 
The identification of the interaction effects requires observing user behavior with and without an ad being 
present. Ideally, one would need pairs of observation that only differ in this respect (i.e, the same SERP 
and the same ads are displayed to “twin” users at the same time). This is not possible in a field experiment 
with a widely used search engine. In a lab, a randomized controlled experiment can be conducted but it 
would be difficult to collect millions of human searches. Therefore, we partitioned the whole observation 
period into a treatment period, during which the ad is displayed, and a control period, during which it is 
not displayed. Thereby, the observations made during the control period can be used to estimate the 
performance that the organic result would have achieved if it was shown solely during the treatment 
period. Following previous work (e.g., Yang and Ghose 2010), we employed a repeated measures design to 
mitigate the influence of unobservable variables that potentially could change between the treatment 
period and the control period: The ad was first displayed for one week and paused for the next week. This 
setting was repeated in the third and the fourth week for the same set of keywords, resulting in a total 
observation period of four weeks. We chose a period in fall 2013 without any national holidays or other 
expected special events that could influence the data. Also, luckily for the experiment, no unexpected 
events (e.g., a major weather disaster) took place at this time. 
Bids worth a US$ five-digit budget were placed for 218 different keywords. All of the keywords have been 
used by the advertiser before and, since our focus is on brand bidding, contain one of his brand names. 
Furthermore, each keyword was specified as “exact”, i.e., to trigger an ad if and only if it matches the 
user’s search query exactly. This way, we avoid aggregation biases that potentially could arise from the 
lack of data on each keyword auction during the observation period (Yang and Ghose 2010).  
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In order to enable testing of the influence of an ad’s content on its performance, we created two different 
ads: The first one is rather general and could, in principle, substitute the organic result because it has a 
similar structure and makes use of so-called sitelinks (links to subpages that are placed below the ad text 
as an extension of the ad) to highlight popular areas of the website. In contrast, the second ad specifically 
promotes one of the company’s products and highlights offers related to this product in its sitelinks. 
Therefore, it can be considered as rather complementary to the organic result and it increases the 
diversity on the SERP. To separate the effects of both ads, we isolated them into two different SEA 
campaigns that we alternated on each day, starting with the general ad on the first day of the first week 
and the specific ad on the first day of the third week. An exception was made for 20 keywords that contain 
the name of the product that the specific ad promotes: For these keywords, the specific ad was shown on 
each day within the treatment period due to the wish of the advertiser, who suspected that the general ad 
would not perform well for these keywords. 
For each keyword, we can observe off-site performance data (impressions, clicks, and costs) as well as 
on-site performance data (conversions, which we define as orders, and revenues) for each displayed result 
separately on a daily aggregated basis. In total, our dataset contains 4 weeks * 7 days * 218 keywords = 
6,104 aggregated observations, of which one half belongs to the control period and the other half belongs 
to the treatment period. They are based on approx. 9 million individual searches. Unfortunately, due to a 
Google policy established in 2011, the on-site performance data of users who have clicked on the organic 
result cannot be tracked (and thus, observed) if they use a secure connection (https). This issue is referred 
to as the “not provided”-problem in practice. However, there are no indications to assume that this loss of 
data does not occur at random (i.e., that https-users systematically behave differently than http-users in 
the context of this study); therefore, it should not bias the results. 
The on-site performance data can be broken down by a consumer dimension and by product: We know 
how many users created new accounts for ordering, used an existing account, or ordered without 
registering, which is also possible at the website. Furthermore, we know how often each product was 
ordered and how much revenue this generated. Thereby, we are able to analyze potential differences in 
the interaction effects stemming from described user or product differences, something that was not 
carried out in previous work. 
Preliminary Results and Interpretations 
A small number of observations had to be eliminated before model estimation. The most common reason 
(354 cases) was that no user searched with the keyword on that day. The remaining 5,696 observations 
were used to estimate the model by the BFGS-algorithm (Broydon 1970; Fletcher 1970; Goldfarb 1970; 
Shanno 1970). Table 1 presents the results, which should be considered as preliminary. 
As could be expected, the probability        
      of a click on the organic result (without a paid result) 
increases with a high relevance and a good position of the organic result as well as low competition. 
Furthermore, it is higher for navigational and transactional keywords than for informational keywords; 
however, the increase is smaller for product-specific keywords.  
Regarding the addition effect, we first find that    
    increases with a high relevance of the ad. This is 
plausible since users who would not consider the advertiser’s target website as fulfilling their desire based 
on the organic result only are more likely to do this based on the paid result if the ad’s content matches 
their search query to a higher degree.    
    also increases with a good position of the paid result. This 
could be for one thing because users may value websites higher that rank top among the paid results (in 
analogy to the ranking of organic results). For another thing, they may get less distracted by competitors’ 
results when evaluating the results top down. Furthermore, we find    
    to be significantly higher for 
transactional keywords than for informational and navigational keywords, for which no significant 
difference was found. This result can possibly be explained by considering the corresponding high 
coefficient of        
     : The great magnitude of users searching with transactional keywords would have 
also clicked on the organic result. The few remaining ones may consider the ad to be targeting their goal 
closer than the organic result. Therefore, they click on the ad when it is present. Next, we find    
    to be 
lower for the specific ad than for the general ad. This can be expected because the specific ad does not 
directly fit the users’ desire for most keywords. However, quiet surprisingly, even for keywords relating to 
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the product advertised by the specific ad,    
    is still lower than for other transactional keywords. This 
may be based on the hope of users searching for certain products to get a special offer when clicking on an 
ad (Jansen et al. 2007). This expectation may be more pronounced if the ad relates to another product 
because users assume that this occurs to grab their attention to a special deal for the advertised product. 
  Logit of         
      Logit of     
    Logit of     
     
(Intercept) 0.561 (0.005)*** 0.555 (0.231)* -0.467 (0.051)*** 
              1.190 (0.002)*** 0.018 (0.012) -0.256 (0.008)*** 
               1.378 (0.014)*** 1.144 (0.032)*** -0.310 (0.018)*** 
                 -0.760 (0.014)*** -0.886 (0.050)*** 1.589 (0.023)*** 
             -2.901 (0.048)*** - - 
              0.650 (0.004)*** - 0.193 (0.011)*** 
               -0.919 (0.003)*** - 0.598 (0.011)*** 
                 - 0.978 (0.021)*** 0.356 (0.013)*** 
                - -1.887 (0.227)*** -0.294 (0.049)*** 
              - -0.386 (0.010)*** -1.710 (0.006)*** 
         -0.058 (0.002)*** 0.302 (0.008)*** 0.124 (0.005)*** 
     0.002 (0.000)*** 0.011 (0.001)*** 0.006 (0.000)*** 
Standard errors are given in brackets. Significance (likelihood ratio): *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
Table 1. Parameter Estimates 
The cannibalization effect,    
     , increases with the relevance of the ad. Users may switch to the ad if they 
have the feeling that they will reach the desired page at the advertiser’s website faster using the ad’s 
landing page than the organic result. This is reinforced by    
     increasing with a weaker position of the 
organic result and a good position of the paid result: Instead of going through all organic results until the 
desired one is found, users click on the paid result to reach the advertiser’s website faster. Furthermore, 
   
     is higher for the specific ad than for the general ad. This makes sense since the ad will cannibalize 
clicks more probably if it fits the users’ desire more closely. For keywords related to the product 
advertised by the specific ad, the effect correspondingly diminishes almost completely. Finally,    
     is 
lower for navigational keywords than for informational keywords and lower for transactional keywords 
than for navigational keywords. This may be because for navigational and transactional keywords, the 
organic result usually has a good position; i.e., there is little incentive for users to switch to the paid result. 
       
      and both interaction effects are subject to a significant but very small time trend. Interestingly, 
both interaction effects were found to be stronger on weekends than on weekdays, suggesting that the 
appeal of the paid result is greater on weekends. This is supported by a negative weekend effect on 
       
      . The reason may be that users have different search intentions on weekends (e.g., because of 
surfing at home) or that the composition of users during the weekend is different than on weekdays (e.g., 
due to a higher percentage of less experienced users). 
Conclusion and Future Work 
In conclusion, based on the first results shown in Table 1, one would advise advertisers to engage in brand 
bidding foremost for navigational and transactional keywords since they exhibit a lower cannibalization 
effect while increasing or not affecting the addition effect. For the same reason, they should bid on 
keywords for which the organic result has a relatively poor position or does not seem relevant. The 
specificity, the position, and the relevance of the ad are found to affect both interaction effects in the same 
 Brand Bidding under Monop0listic Conditions 
  
 Thirty Fifth International Conference on Information Systems, Auckland 2014 9 
way. This means that addition and cannibalization both increase (or decrease) with an unpredictable net 
result with respect to the number of clicks. 
We assume that if brand bidding pays off for quasi-monopolists, it should also pay off for non-
monopolists: For the latter, we expect the addition effect to be greater since their paid result will attract 
not only users who would not have clicked at all in its absence but also users who would have clicked on a 
competitor’s result. 
Since the main financial goal of an advertiser is to increase his profit, our next steps are to extend the 
analysis to conversions, revenues, and profit. The effects of brand bidding on the number of specific 
products sold and the number of new users become especially important at these levels and will be 
analyzed in this context. Furthermore, we plan to define more complex models that relax our assumptions 
about user behavior and allow for endogenous relationships of variables. 
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